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1.1Introduction
The impact of firm acquisitions on the value of both the acquiring
and the acquired firm has been the subject of a large and growing body
of research (see, for example, Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 1986; and
in this volume, Franks, Harris, and Mayer; Hall; and Ruback). But
there are no similar systematic investigations of the impact of corporate
acquisitions on labor. A lack of concern about how labor fares in a
takeover cannot be the reason for the absence of statistical analysis of
this question; indeed, the popular press (and, presumably, its readers)
are fascinated by the subject.
The public's perception is conditioned by a relatively small number
of highly publicized and extremely hostile takeovers. What comes to
mind immediately is the elaborate history of Carl Icahn, Frank Lor-
enzo, and the airline industry. Also widely covered was the extensive
employment loss—estimated at 25,000 jobs—associated with the take-
over attempts made on two major food store chains, Safeway Stores
and Lucky Stores.
Organized labor has explicitly stated its concern that acquisitions
are bad for workers (AFL—CIO 1987, El):
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1
Workers and their unions have a vital interest in the corporate take- k
over issue. Corporate mergers, takeovers, and leveraged buy-outs d
often have serious effects on jobs, wages, and working conditions.
The general public exhibits similar concern. A recent survey by Louis
Harris and Associates revealed that 58percentof the sample believes d
• that hostile takeovers do more harm than good. Moreover, when re- Ii
spondents were asked which one group they thought ought to be pro- fi
tected most from being hurt in a hostile takeover, 63 percent said
"employees" (Louis Harris and Associates, 1987).
Despite these fears, it is not obvious that acquisitions necessarily h
lower wages and employment. One reason for being skeptical about e
any widespread injury to workers from acquisitions is the highly un- a
representative set of takeovers that has received the most publicity. ti
Another reason for skepticism lies in an understanding of the various y
motives for acquisitions. First, acquisitions may occur because of dif- e
ferences in opinion, with the buyer thinking the acquisition more valu- ii
ablethan the seller. Second, acquisitions may occur because a group P
outside the firm believes it can manage the firm more efficiently than P
current management (Jensen 1984). Third, acquisitions may occur be- Y
cause the sale may permit the abrogation of rules governing employ- g
ment and earnings at smaller costs to employee morale and the firm's e
reputation (Shleifer and Summers, in this volume). fi
The first possible reason for an acquisition does not imply impending
disaster for labor: to the contrary, if the acquiring optimist is correct, 1
increased prosperity for workers might be just around the corner. The
second reason also need not be a harbinger of bad times: better man-
a agement might lead to more and better jobs. This is particularly true
if the new managers have better access to capital markets for expanding
the operation. The third reason, however, can be expected to be as-
sociated with worse conditions for workers. Although these worse
conditions are usually blamed on the acquiring owners or managers,
ai they typically reflect some significant change in market conditions, such
as deregulation in the airline industry. Indeed, if the acquisition shocks
ei the workers into accepting changes in work rules, employment and
wages could actually be improved by the acquisition.
When the dust settles, does labor win or lose from the typical ac-
quisition? In particular, what happens to wages and employment? In a this paper, we address these questions. To do so, we use data on the
employment and wages of firms in Michigan compiled from unem- 1.
ployment insurance (ES202) records kept by the Michigan Employment
Security Commission. The MESC data file has several useful charac- 2.
teristics: consistent longitudinal data for six and one-half years (1978:111—
1984:IV); the inclusion of small firms likely to be absent from other
data files; and the identification of acquisitions as part of the book-r
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e- keeping needed to run the unemployment insurance (UI) system. Its
its disadvantages are the result of its being limited to a single state: Mich-
s. igan is not representative of the entire nation, the data do not reflect
is what is happening in other locations of multistate companies, and the
data chart relatively few of the mega-acquisitions which dominate pub-
lic attention. The data also do not allow us to distinguish between
friendly and hostile takeovers. Hence, our findings apply to acquisitions
id in general, and not necessarily to hostile takeovers.
In section 1.2 we describe the data in greater detail. Our twin goals
ly here are to specify the issues that arise in distinguishing between merg-
ers and other sorts of acquisitions and to give an overview of the char-
acteristics of firms that were and were not involved in acquisitions in
the years in question. In section 1.3 we describe our methods of anal-
ysis. Sections 1 .4 and 1.5 document our measures of the impact of merg-
if- ers on wages and employment. In the case of mergers we compare post-
merger wages and employment to the wages and employment of the two
partners taken together. The longitudinal data provide several years of
an preacquisition information to serve as a base for the analysis and several
years of subsequent data to go beyond the very short-term effects. In
general, we find small (and sometimes positive) changes in wages and
L'S employment following an acquisition. In section 1.6 we summarize our
findings and discuss options for future work.
ng
1.2The Data
he The file of MESC records available at the Institute for Social Research
at the University of Michigan includes data on over 200,000 firms over
ile the period 1978:111 through l984:IV) Employment data are calculated
ng monthly, and total payroll (not UI-taxable payroll) data are calculated
LS- quarterly. As part of the normal bookkeeping of the UI system, MESC
Se identifies situations in which the assets of one firm (a "predecessor")
5, are acquired by another (a "successor"). The file used in this paper does
not include predecessors as separate firms, but it includes predecessor
employment and payroll prior to the acquisition in separate "predeces-
sor" fields on the successor firm's longitudinal record.2
In thinking about the impact of acquisitions on employment and
wages. it is important to distinguish among several different types of
he acquisitions:
I. Firm A changes ownership without being integrated with any other
nt firm;
2. Firm A purchases the assets of firm B without absorbing its work
:i— force;
er 3. Firm A purchases firm B and (at least initially) absorbs (most of)
k- firm B's workers, or firm A and firm B combine to form firm C,12Charles Brown and James L. Medoff 13
with (at least initially) firm C including (most of) the workers of betw
firmsAandB.
true The key to distinguishing among these types of acquisitions is the
pattern of predecessor (P) and successor (S) employment over time. M
Let T be the period of the acquisition, the last period in which P is Pr
positive. In situation I we would observe this pattern:
Month 1 2...T—lTT+1 T+2 T+3 ...
St
Predecessor P1P2 ... 0 0 0
employment One
Successor 00 ... 0 0ST+ IST+2 ... firm
employment next
We might expect ST+I =Prif the firm's employment was stable. In
any case, the pattern of zero employment for the successor through T
makes this case easy to distinguish from the others.
th
n
In situation 2 we should observe:
OS
Month 1 2 ...T—lTT+1 T+2 T+3 ... (a)
Predecessor P1P2.. 0 0 0
employment (b)
Successor 52 •..ST_iSTST+IST+2 5T+3
employment Cot
the
Because the successor is acquiring the assets but not the workers of ces
the predecessor, we expect ST÷IST. Coi
Finally, situation 3—at least mergers of two firms doing business in cou
Michigan—should generate this pattern:3
Month 1 2 ...T—lTT+1 T+2 T+3...
PredecessorP,P2... PT0 0 0 ..
. disi
employment cat
Successor S2 ...ST_I5T 5T+25T÷3 .
. CX
employment
Unless employment is growing or fluctuating significantly, should oth
approximately equal PT + ST. bu:
There are three problems in classifying acquisitions with these data. sal
First, we have no information on mergers between in-state and out-of- sol
state firms. When an in-state firm is acquired by an out-of-state firm, sot
there will be no record of the successor prior to the acquisition, and
so it will look like a type 1 acquisition. Conversely, when an out-of-
state firm is acquired by an in-state firm, there is no record of the rer
merger at all. pa
The second problem lies in distinguishing between acquisitions in tWI
which the successor acquires the predecessor's workers and acquisi-
tions inwhich the successor does not. The only evidence to distinguish sal
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of between cases 2 and 3 is whether ST÷,Si-' or ST+IPT + ST. If
andare unstable and/oris small, it will be hard to identify
true mergers. To see this, consider this record:
he
ie. Month 1 2...T—1TT+l T+2 T+3
is Predecessor 4 3 ... 5 4 0 0 0
employment
Successor 100 101 ...105107110110110
• employment
One interpretation is that the two firms merged in month T, creating a
firm with Ill employees, all but one of whom was employed in the
next month. The other interpretation is that the successor expanded
by 3 workers at the same time as it acquired the assets (but not the
In employees) of the predecessor.
T In the tables below we identify as type 3 acquisitions or "mergers"
those records that have positive successor employment prior to T and
—(ST + PT) . —Sr (a) > —0.50, or equivalently, > 0.50
rT
(b)P,->10
Condition (a) says the successor must grow by at least 50 percent of
the predecessor's employment. Condition (b) requires that the prede-
of cessor be large enough that condition (a) is practically meaningful.4
Conditions like these are needed if artificial inflation of the merger
Ifl count is to be avoided.5 The particular cutoffs are, to be sure, arbitrary.
A third problem is that the predecessor-successor relationship ap-
plies to reorganizations as well as to acquisitions. It is difficult to
distinguish reorganizations from type 1 acquisitions (simple sales) be-
cause the pattern of predecessor and successor employment would be
exactly the same. A "type of business" (for example, proprietorship,
partnership, corporation) field is available, however, and we can dis-
tinguish cases where the type of business changes. We call cases that
Id otherwise look like simple sales but show a change in the type of
business code "reorganizations." The distinction between "simple
a. sales" and "reorganizations" is not as clean as we would like, since
some restructuring does not involve a change of business type while
n, some sales are accompanied by such a change.
To summarize, type I acquisitions are those for which there is no
successor employment prior to Tand for which the "type of business"
remains the same. Type 2 acquisitions are those for which there is
positive successor employment prior to T but which do not satisfy the
in two conditions (a) and (b) above. Type 3 acquisitions are those for
which there is positive successor employment prior to T and which do
satisfy those two conditions. We will sometimes refer to types 1, 2,14 Charles Brown and James L. Medoff
and3 as "simple sales," "assets-only sales." and "mergers," respec-
tively. We treat "reorganizations" as a separate category, though they
are not our primary focus. We ignore those acquisitions that occurred
in 1978 or l984:IV because the predecessor and successor data on them
are scant.
Because acquisitions—and especially mergers—are fairly rare events
but the MESC file is enormous, we constructed an "extract file" con-
sisting of all firms with nonzero predecessor fields and a 20 percent
sample of other firms. Most of our analysis, however, is based on a
smaller file, consisting of observations that had relatively complete
data. More specifically, we included an observation in what we call the
"clean-data file" only if there was some employment and payroll data
in each year.
Table 1.1 offers an overview of the extract file and the clean-data
file. Two findings shown in the table are striking. First, even remem-
bering that the "no predecessor" cases represent a 20 percent sub-
sample, the relative frequency of "reorganizations" compared to no-
predecessor firms over the six years 1979—84 is striking. (We also found
the frequency of type 2 (assets only) acquisitions surprisingly high.)
The second striking finding in the table is that the clean-data file is so
much smaller than the complete extract. There are two reasons for
this. First, birth and death rates of firms are quite high, and they show
up as "missing" data in the years before a birth or after a death. Connor,
Heeringa, and Jackson (1985) note that both births and deaths are very
common in these data. We will have a little to say about deaths later
in the paper. Second, there are some missing data, although we have
somewhat reduced their influence by eliminating only observations for
which the data are missing for an entire year.
Table 1 .2 divides the extract and clean-data files by broad industry
type. The distribution of observations in the two files is quite similar,
Table 1.1 An Overview of the E File and the Clean.Data File
Type of Firm




Type Iacquisition: simple sale
Type 2 acquisition: assets-only sale
Type 3 acquisition: merger
Reorganization









tThis category also includes a small number of acquisitions for which missing data made









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Charles Brown and James L. Medoff
Table 1.3 Average FirmEmployment, by Type of Acquisition
Average Number of Employees
Extract File Clean-Data File
Type of Acquisition 1978 1984 1978 1984
No predecessor 22 20 29 27
(284) (233) (350) (296)
[21,535] [23,186] [14,005] [14,005]
Type I acquisition: simple sale 17 17 21 20
(114) (97) (140) (110)
[6,166] [5,376] [4,055] [4,055]
Type 2 acquisition: assets-only sale 114 99 130 109
(1,672) (1,082) (1,813) (1,142)
[2,815] [2,665] [2,391] [2,391]
Type 3 acquisition: merger 255 262 264 268
(740) (708) (758) (717)
[462] [451] [438] [438]
Reorganization 9 10 10 II
(65) (61) (74) (72)
[12,814] [13,194] [9,363] [9,363]
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses and sample sizes in brackets below the
means.
with the clean-data file having proportionately fewer construction firms
and more manufacturing firms than the extract file from which it was
derived. The three types of acquisitions are also spread broadly across
industries.
Table 1.3 shows the average level of employment in the firms in the
two files, categorized by the type of acquisition. Our employment vari-
able includes the employment of both partners in cases where an ac-
quisition occurred. The mean value for 1978 excludes those cases in
the extract file where employment in 1978 was zero (missing); the mean
value for 1984 similarly excludes observations with zero (missing) 1984
employment.
A comparison between the mean levels of employment in the extract
file and in the clean-data file shows that average firm size is larger in
the latter. This is exactly what one would expect, because births and
deaths are more common among small firms than among large ones.
Comparing the number of firms and the mean employment by type of
acquisition brings out an important but less obvious fact. Although the
average size of firms in type I acquisitions is small (17 workers, in the
1984 figures from the extract file), there are many such firms. Type 2
firms are larger, but there are proportionately fewer of them. Type 3
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fewer of them. Overall, the 1984 data from the extract file show there
were roughly 85,000 workers employed in firms involved in typeI
acquisitions; 265,000 workers in type 2 acquisitions; and 115,000 work-
ers in type 3 acquisitions (mergers). After taking account of the fact
• that the no-predecessor firms in table 1.3 are a 20 percent sample, we
calculate that roughly 3, 9, and 4 percent, respectively, of workers in
7 Michigan worked for firms involved in the three types of acquisitions
6) in this period.
Finally, table 1.4 presents information about employment levels at
• the predecessor and successor firms, measured three months before
the acquisition, and at the combined entity one month afterward. Three
conclusions stand out. First, the predecessors in type I and type 2
2) acquisitions are small (averaging 20 workers and 11 workers, respec-
tively), while the acquired firms in type 3 acquisitions (mergers) are
8 on average medium-size (78 workers). Second, as one might expect,
7) the successor (acquiring) firms are typically larger than the predeces-
81 sors. Third, on average type 2 successors do not grow —St,.=— 2),
despite having acquired the assets of predecessors with an average of
2) 11 workers, whereas type 3 successors grow by nearly all the employ-
ment at the acquired firm (ST+I —ST =79;PT =78).In part, this last
contrast follows from the definition of type 2 and type 3 acquisitions,
but it is sharper than one might have guessed on purely definitional
grounds.
1.3Method of Analysis
To assess the relationship between changes in ownership and changes
in wages and employment, we will compare firms involved in acqui-
sitions in year Twith the much larger set of firms that were not involved




































Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses below means.18Charles Brown and James L. Nledoff 19
in any acquisitions (that is, that had zero predecessor employment) I
throughout the sample period.6 Our wage equation is: mv
(1)In WT+J= + W1+ +€., the
1978 k—I acc
co'
• where Wisthe payroll per worker (per month); Eisemployment (av-
eragedover all months where positive employment is reported); Bis in
a "base year" either one or two years prior to 1';andDkisa dummy
variable that equals one when the firm is involved in a type kacquisition
(k= 1,2,3)or reorganization (k= 4)in year T, and zero otherwise. 1.4
Notshown explicitly in equation (1) are one-digit industry dummy
variables, which are added to each equation. For each acquisition year sei
T, separate equations are estimated for each year T + j,forJ= wh
through T + j= 1984(for example, for T =1981we have four equa-
tions, one for each of the years 198 1—84). the
Our employment equation is slightly more complicated: eff
err
(2) = + +YkDkE +
1978 1—1978
whereEisthe firm's average employment in the years prior to the
merger. Interacting Dk withmeans that the impact of the various
types of acquisitions is proportional to the premerger level of employ-
ment rather than being a fixed number of workers for all firm sizes.7
We weight the observations to produce a homoskedastic error term.8 In
Weuse E rather than In E as our dependent variable because it allows In
us to consider (in section 1.5)theimpact of adding to the clean-data
sample those firms that appear to have "died" after year T, by treating
them as having ET+f0.
The ideas underlying these equations are borrowed from the litera-
ture that evaluates the impact of employment-training programs on
individuals' earnings and employment (see, for example, Bloch 1979).
Holding constant the history of the firm prior to T, we ask whether In
firmsinvolved in changes of ownership had significantly different wages In
(or employment) jyearsthereafter.9
Using T — I as the base year is the natural choice in our framework.
The choice of year T —2is motivated by the possibility that firms
involved in mergers in year Twere subject to unusual transitory shocks
in the previous year, from which they would anyway recover. Using
T —2as the base year ignores those shocks in predicting outcomes in —
















In the results reported in the next section we study (separately) firms
involved in acquisitions in 1981 and in 1982. These middle-of-the-sample
years were chosen to ensure several years of data after T (to evaluate
the consequences of acquisitions) and several years before T (to control
accurately for prior conditions). In each case our "control group"
consists of the firms not involved in an acquisition at any point between
1978 and 1984; we exclude altogether those firms that were involved
in acquisitions in one of the other years.
1.4WageEquations
The key results from estimating equation (1) for T =1981are pre-
sented in table 1.5. The top half of the table uses 1980 as the base year,
while the bottom half uses 1979. Each column of the table represents
the predicted employment for the year shown. Only the coefficients of
the four dummy variables are reported, although each set of four co-
efficients comes from a (separate) equation with lagged wages and
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
tSS = simple sale: AO = assets-only sale; M =merger; R = reorganization.20Charles Brown and James L. Medoff
The choice of base year makes little difference to the results, and
so our discussion will focus on the equations with 1980 as the base
year. In the three years after the acquisition (1982—84), wages at firms
involved in type 1 (simple sale) acquisitions averaged about 4 percent
lower than one would otherwise predict from their pre-1981 wages and
employment. Similarly, wages were about 5 percent higher in firms
involved in type 2 (assets-only) acquisitions. Firms involved in mergers
had wages about 5 percent lower than we estimate they otherwise would
be. But in contrast to the previous coefficients, the standard errors of
these estimates are sizable. It is worth emphasizing that these last
results refer to the average wages in the postmerger firm, controlling
for the (weighted average of) premerger wages at both the predecessor
and the successor)°
Analogous results for the 1982 acquisitions are presented in table
1.6. Although the "control groups" in tables 1.5 and 1.6 are the same,
the firms involved in acquisitions are completely different, so that table
1 .6 is a nearly independent replication of the previous table. The most
important difference is that the coefficient of D3 is now tiny (averaging
—1.5percent for 1983 and 1984).
We also reestimated equation (1), restricting the sample to firms
































1981 1982 1983 1984
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In E78 ..InE•81








































































21The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor
to those in tables1.5 and 1.6 but somewhatsmaller. They averaged
—1, 0, and —2 percent for type 1, 2, and 3 acquisitions, respectively.
We conclude, therefore, that the impact of acquisitions on wages in
our sample is small.
1.5Employment Equations
The results of estimating equation (2) for T =l981are summarized
in table 1.7. Once again, the choice of base year—l980 (top half of
table) or 1979 (bottom half)—has little effect on the results, and we
therefore focus on the coefficients from the 1980 base-year equations.
Firms experiencing a simple sale in 1981 had employment in 1982—
84 about 3 percent higher than one would otherwise have predicted.
Those involved in assets-only acquisitions had employment about 5
percent lower than would be expected. The employment at firms that
merged was indistinguishably different from what we estimate it would
have been in the absence of the merger.
Analogous results for the 1982 acquisitions appear in table 1 .8. Un-
fortunately, there are appreciable differences between the coefficients
in table 1.8 and those in table 1.7. The effect of a simple sale is now
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(.027)22Charles Brown and James L. Medoff
types of acquisitions are also a bit larger (—6 percent and 3 percent,
respectively) when one averages over the two postacquisition years
(1983 and 1984). Moreover, the merger effects (the coefficients of D3)
are sensitive to the choice of a base year, reaching 8 percent when 1980
rather than 1981 is the base.
This instability across years—and the fact that the results were also
sensitive to whether we specified the equation as logarithmic, linear,
or (as in tables 1.7 and 1.8) weighted linear—makes us less confident
about these results than about the wage results in tables 1.5 and 1.6.
Averaging across base years and across the two tables, the three em-
ployment effects are roughly 9 percent (simple sales), —5 percent (as-
sets only), and 2 percent (mergers).
As noted in section 1.2, our results use a sample of firms that reported
wages and employment in each year. Thus, firms are deleted if they
"were born" or "died" during the sample period or if for some reason
a whole year's data were missing. To explore the consequences of
deleting "deaths" from the sample, we considered a slightly different
sample-inclusion criterion. We reran our analysis of employment at
firms involved in acquisitions in 1981 (table 1.7), including firms that
reported zero employment in 1982 or 1983 through 1984 (in other words,
firms that disappeared for at least two years after 1981 and did not






Proportional Effect on Employment in:
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ent, : reappear). Even though this loosening increased the sample consid-
ars erably (from about 17,000 to about 20,000), the coefficients of our
D3) acquisitiondummy variables did not change appreciably. The largest
980 change was for D3,whosecoefficient moved from zero (averaging 1982—




1.6. Based on our analysis of the MESC data, we find that firms that are
em- part of "simple sales" have postsale wages about 5percentlower than
(as- they would otherwise be, but employment roughly 9 percent higher. Firms
that are part of "assets only" acquisitions" have wages about 5percent
-ted higher than they would otherwise be, but employment about 5percent
hey lower. Mergers are associated with wage declines of about 4 percent and
son employment growth of about 2 percent.
of Two qualifications are in order in viewing these results. First, as we
ent noted in section 1 .5,theestimated employment effects are sensitive to
t at which year's acquisitions we study, and to other specification details.
that Second, our wage measure is the average payroll per worker, and it
rds, will therefore deviate from a more ideal wage measure if composition
not of the work force is changing. In particular, if (as is usually the case)
newly hired workers earn less than others in the firm, our wage changes
will tend to be negatively related to employment changes. The fact that
the effect of each type of acquisition on wages is opposite in sign from
its effect on employment is consistent with this interpretation. The
tin: estimated effects of mergers on wages are also subject to a different
composition effect. If the (relatively high paid) head of the acquired
— firmleaves following the merger, average wages will fall. Given the
156 small size of our typical firms, a nontrivial share of our estimated wage
013) decline from mergers may be due to such compositional effects.
.067 At this early stage of our research, is difficult to be certain whether
.008) thesepatterns are consequences or merely correlates of the acquisi-
I) tions. But, at least in our sample, the common public perception that






.013) 1. For a description of the construction, characteristics, andavailabilityof
.141 this file, see Connor, Converse, Heeringa, and Jackson (1984).
.020) 2. Predecessor data are aggregated in the relatively rare case of multiple
— predecessors.Thus, if firm A acquires firm B and later firm C, the predecessor24Charles Brown and James L. Medoff r 25
field on A's recordincludes the sumof B and C's employment and payroll up Asquit
to the time when B is acquired, and then only C's employment and payroll the I
until C is acquired. After C is acquired, succeeding months' (quarters') em- Bloch,
ployment (payroll) data are blank. Con
3. If the two firms form a new firm, which firm is called the successor is, Connc
for our purposes, arbitrary. The
4. In scanning the raw data, we noticed that in some cases P fell and S rose Mic
just before P became zero. If P in month T was less than half of its value three of
months earlier, we used P and S in month T—3instead of month T in the Connc
above tests. This led to a slight increase in the number of type 3 cases and a und
corresponding reduction in the number of type 2 cases. Res
5. Even with the relatively conservative definition of type 3 acquisitions and Frank
therefore relatively broad definition of type 2 acquisitions, 20 percent of the in
type 2 firms in the clean-data file had exactly equal toand another 20 volt
percent had ST+I less than Si.. The phenomenon of acquiring the assets but not Louis
the workers of the predecessor appears, therefore, to be real. peo
6. To simplify notation, we suppress a subscript for individual firms, but our Cha
unit of observation is, of course, firms. Jense
7. We estimated the unweighted equation and then regressed the absolute 85
error on a constant term and premerger employment. We found that both Rubac
coefficients were consistently positive, suggesting that the error variance in- con
creased, but less than proportionately, with the size of the firm.
8. We also interacted the industry dummy variables with E.
9. One could, of course, hold constant employment and wages through year
T +j — Iin the equation with year T +j asthe dependent variable, but that
significantly complicates the interpretation of the results. With that specifi- LOl
cation, the impact of, say, DLonIn WT+Iwoulddepend on the coefficient of
DL in that year's equation plus the indirect effects of DL on In WT times the Brov
effect of In on In ÷andof Dk on In Er times the effect of In ET oral
InW7÷1. p
10.One might expect that wages at the postmerger firm would move toward and
the wages at the premerger successor, since the successor has acquired the mcdi
predecessor. We added a term reflecting the difference in In-wages between empi
predecessor and successor to the equation (1) specification, but it was never th
significant. Basically, we cannot tell whether our conjecture is true because of work the limited number of mergers in the data.
11. Recall that this category includes mergers involving tiny predecessors,
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cifi- Comment Geoffrey Carliner
it of
the Brown and Medoff have directed their attention to the market for cor-
TOfl porate control of very small firms. The other papers in this volume,
yard and all the controversy surrounding mergers and acquisitions in other
the media, focus on very large and visible corporations with thousands of
teen employees and price tags in nine figures. Brown and Medoff's study
ever is therefore useful in reminding us that a substantial fraction of the
e of work force is employed by small firms, among which the only hostile
ors takeovers are fights among brothers and sisters over who should run
the family business.
As the authors note, the market for ownership of small firms is highly
turbulent. According to their data for 1978, 129,932 private sector firms
in Michigan were included in the unemployment insurance system, with
a total employment of 3.029 million workers (see table I).' By 1984
only 86,272 of these firms were still contributing to Michigan's un-
employment insurance system. The remaining 43,660 firms had
om- Geoffrey Carliner is executive director of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
El
— 1.Unfortunately, all of Brown and Medoff's tables report data for a 20 percent sample
of firms with no change in ownership and for the entire population of firms that changed
hands. Thus, it is impossible to know the number of characteristics of all the firms in




































































































Source: Brown and Medoff, table 1.3.
presumablygone out of existence. In addition, 6,884 of the surviving
firms experienced type 1, 2, or 3 changes in ownership during this
period, according to the authors' data.
Although the firms that disappeared tended to be small, the number
of workers affected was not small. Total employment in all firms in
Michigan. in 1978 was 3.029 million. The firms still in existence in 1984
had 2.637 million employees in 1978. Thus 392,000 employees, or 13
percent of Michigan's private sector employees in 1978, worked for
firms that had disappeared by 1984, and an additional 545,000 employ-
ees, or 18 percent of all 1978 employees, worked for firms that later
changed ownership.2
In the regression results shown in tables 1.5—1.8, Brown and Medoff
restrict their sample to firms with data for all seven years, that is, the
surviving firms. They recognize, however, that omitting firms that die
within a few years may distort their estimates of the effect of ownership
transfers on wages and employment. They therefore also ran their
employment regressions for a sample including the firms that subse-
quently disappeared.
2.On top of this loss of jobs, total employment fell in thefirms that did survive, from
2.637 million to 2.453 million. The increased employment among new firms of 471 thou-
sand (2.924 — 2.453) did not offset the declines from these two sources, and so on net
total employment in Michigan fell during this period.
Changes in Employment, 1978—84 (in thousands)
Firm deaths 2,637 — 3,029 ,= —392
Change in firm size 2,453 — 2,637 = — 184
Firm births 2,924 — 2,453 =47!
Total change 2,924 — 3,029=— 105ziThe ImpactofFirm Acquisitionson Labor
A priori, I would have expected firms that change hands to fail more
often than other firms, at least for the small stores and service firms
Saflds) that constitute two-thirds of Brown and Medoff's observations. A firm
ving ownedby a new, presumably less experienced, owner seems more
likelytO disappear than an otherwise similar firm that does not change
hands, and so I expected the regressions on the full sample to have a
smaller coefficient for type 1 firms (simple change in ownership). Brown
1.891 and Medoff's finding of a 3 percent to 15 percent increase in employ-
103 ment for type 1 firms, even when corporate deaths are included in the
regression, is quite surprising.
81 I also question their estimate that workers in type 3 firms (mergers)
261 experienced wage declines of up to 5 percent. Their calculations of the
117 number of firms and workers involved in transfers of ownership is
2.453 seriously understated, and it may bias their regression results. As Brown
and Medoff recognize, they observe only transfers that occurred be-
tween firms in Michigan, since their data source has no information on
mergers or acquisitions between Michigan firms and out-of-state firms.
this For instance, General Motors' acquisition of EDS and Hughes Aircraft
would probably not be recorded in their data. Since most Fortune 500
imber firms are continually buying and selling small firms, Brown and Medoff
ms in fail to include a large number of employees who should be counted as
1984 working for type 3 firms.
or 13 One indication of the size of this problem is the estimate of average
for firm size. As calculated from their table 1.3, the average number of
;ploy- employees per firm in Michigan in 1984 was 21. In contrast, national
t later data from the Current Population Survey indicate that 56 percent of
private sector employees work for firms with 100 or more employees,
edoff and 42 percent are with firms that have 500 or more employees.3 It is
s the very unlikely that firms in Michigan are so much smaller than firms in
at die other states. The likely explanation of this difference is that the Mich-
igan data exclude out-of-state employment. Only the Michigan em-
their ployees of large firms show up in the data used by Brown and Medoff.
ubse- The effect of omitting firms with out-of-state mergers is probably to
overstate the effect of mergers on the wages and employment of the
acquiring firm. When GM buys a small auto parts maker in Illinois,
from theeffect on the number and wages of its employees in Michigan is
thou- likelyto be negligible. By Brown and Medoff's definitions, however,
on net GM and its Michigan employees should be counted as a type 3 change
in ownership in this case.
3. The U.S. Small Business Administration (1986, 229). The U.S. data are for private
sector wage and salary employees excluding agricultural and private household workers.
About 2 percent of the Michigan firms were agricultural.28 Charles Brown and James L. Medolf 29—
Inconclusion, I think that the type of analysis presented by Brown bOUfl(
andMedoff will lead to a deeper understanding of an ignored aspect to giv
of labor market dynamics. Economists have examined longitudinal data of
on individuals for many years now, and as a result we know a great effect
deal more about the effects of individual characteristics on labor force porta
participation, retirement, and unemployment. Until recently we have that c
had panel data only for the largest corporations, and so we have not Thi
been able to study the behavior of small firms over time. Studies like classi
this one will offer important insights into the ways in which industries and a
grow and contract. They have little to do, however, with the hostile exam
takeovers and other ownership changes among large firms that are the (type
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Comment Henry S. Farber empli
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Given the public and professional perception of mergers and acquisi- schei
tions as involving one Goliath joining or swallowing another, the anal- ployt
ysis presented by Brown and Medoff serves as a refreshing reminder that
that the modal merger or acquisition actually involves two Davids rather negai
than two Goliaths. When viewed in this context, the popular image of posit
a corporate raider taking over a large and probably unionized company, type
abrogating or renegotiating existing implicit or explicit labor contracts, empl
and reducing both wages and employment seems to be less applicable empl
than one might have thought. Th
Brown and Medoff conclude from their analysis of data from the the e
Michigan unemployment insurance system administrative records that and
there are only small and sometimes positive changes in wages and the
employment on average following a merger or acquisition. Although are
the analysis is straightforward and the authors are candid about its ployl
limitations, a few points bear closer examination. findii
The central limitation of the data is that it deals exclusively with inter
employment in Michigan. The implications of this go substantially be- findii
yond the usual caveat that Michigan may be different from other states, and
In particular, many firms have business operations that span state wage
acqu
Henry S. Farber is professorofeconomics at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- ers.
nologyand aresearch associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. timal29The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor
3rown boundaries, so that looking strictly at Michigan employment is likely
aspect to give a misleading picture of both the employment size distribution
data of firms involved in mergers and acquisitions and the employment
great effects of mergers and acquisitions. This point is obviously more im-
force portant for larger firms because they are more likely to have operations
have that cross state boundaries.
not This limitation of the data interacts in a serious way with the central
like classification scheme used by Brown and Medoff. They break mergers
istries and acquisitions into three categories that are potentially affected by
examining only Michigan employment. For example, simple sales
re the (type I events) are said to occur when the successor firm has no prior
Michigan employment. But an out-of-state firm with substantial em-
ployment could acquire a Michigan firm in what is really a merger with
or acquisition by a previously existing firm.
More generally, the authors' classification scheme is not entirely
Wash- satisfactory, as they recognize. Aside from the caveat noted in the
previous paragraph, the classification of simple sales seems straight-
forward. Nevertheless, the distinction between "assets-only" acqui-
sitions and mergers that retain the workers is less convincing. Since
an important part of what Brown and Medoff are interested in is the
employment effect of a merger or acquisition, using employment changes
to classify the event does not seem appropriate. This classification
quisi- scheme leads to problems later when the authors investigate the em-
anal- ployment effects of the three types of acquisitions. It is not surprising
under that they find type 2 (assets-only) mergers and acquisitions have small
rather negative employment effects. The effects were defined not to have
age of positive employment changes. Similarly,itis not surprising that
ipany, type 3 (assets and work forces) mergers and acquisitions have positive
,racts, employment effects. The effects here were defined not to have negative
icable employment changes.
The method of analysis is quite straightforward. Both the wage and
m the the employment level equations are estimated conditional on past wage
s that and employment levels, and dummy variables are included for each of
s and the three types of events. The coefficients of these dummy variables
tough are interpreted as the effects of each of the events on wages and em-
ut its ployment. With regard to wage changes, this analysis is not bad. The
finding that average wages drop by 3 to 5 percent after simple sales is
with interesting, and it would be considered by some to be substantial. The
ly be- finding that wages seem to be 3 to 5 percent higher after type 2 mergers
tates. and acquisitions is interesting, but it cannot get at what happens to the
state wages of the acquired workers precisely because type 2 mergers and
acquisitions are defined as cases in which there are no acquired work-
fTech- ers.The mixed results, though with predominantly negative point es-
timates obtained for the type 3 mergers and acquisitions, when combined
-430Charles Brown and James L. Medoff 31
with the consistently significantly negative wage effects found for sim-
ple sales, serve as evidence that acquired workers receive lower wages
after a merger or acquisition. Whether the magnitudes involved are
large or small is a matter of judgment.
With regard to employment levels, the analysis is less convincing.
This is largely because the classification system obscures the true effect
of mergers and acquisitions. The interesting question is how prevalent
the negative employment effects are relative to the positive employ-
ment effects. The method of constructing the data almost guarantees
that type 2 mergers and acquisitions will have nonpositive employment
changes, while type 3 mergers and acquisitions will have nonnegative
employment changes. Econometrically, the dummy variables are de-
fined in a way that ensures their correlation with the dependent variable
and hence with the error term in the regression. It might be more useful
not to make a distinction between type 2 and type 3 mergers and
acquisitions.
If no distinction were made between the two types, the coefficient
of the "non—simple sale" dummy variable might be a useful summary
statistic for the employment effects of these events. On the basis of
the numbers presented, a very crude estimate of the overall employ-
ment effect can be derived as a weighted average of the estimated
effects for each type of event. By the data in table 1.3, type 2 mergers
and acquisitions account for approximately 70 percent of the employ-
ment in the two types of mergers and acquisitions in total. Using the
results in table 1.7, I assume an average employment effect of type 2
mergers and acquisitions of —.04and an average employment effect
of type 3 mergers and acquisitions of + .04. Weighting these by .7 and
.3,respectively,yieldsanadmittedlycrudeoveralleffectof
.7(— .04) + .3(.04) =—0.016.Of course, this calculation does not
account for any systematic bias in the estimates in table 1.7 induced
by the endogenous categorization scheme, but it does suggest that the
average employment effects are close to zero.
One useful modification of the analysis would be to estimate the
wage and employment equations as straightforward differences, rather
than as levels equations with lagged dependent variables. This alter-
ation would make interpreting the results very easy, and an additional
column in table 1.4 with average proportional changes in employment
between T —3and T + 1 would serve as a useful summary of the
employment effects. A table similar to table 1.4 for wages could also
be constructed.
Overall, Brown and Medoff present some fascinating facts, although
I wish they had presented simpler summary statistics and frequency
















sim- fairly convincing, and we have the interesting finding that wages do
ages indeed drop on average after mergers or acquisitions. The analysis of
are employment changes isless Convincing. The distinction between
type 2 and type 3 events is artificial, and it serves only to confuse the
ing empirical analysis. In addition, the exclusion of non-Michigan em-
hect ployment must add considerable noise to the employment change
dent analysis.
/
doy- A final comment concerns the relevance of the authors' analysis to
itees the general debate on the causes and effects of mergers and acquisi-
nent tions. Obviously, the debate has focused on the very large events.
ative Brown and Medoff's sample is very heavily weighted toward much
de- smaller events. On this basis their analysis and the general debate are
lable on different planes. Nonetheless, although the authors may have little
seful to say about Carl Icahn and compatriots directly, the phenomenon they
and do address is important, and their study is a useful contribution to our
limited stock of knowledge of the smaller acquisitions.
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